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The Law, the Law, the Law, and the Law:
Submission, Absence, or Organization?
James E. Faulconer

INTRODUCTION: DIVERSITY

principle of the world. It was, to borrow a term from
Jacques Lacan (1901–1981), a symbolic ordering. A symbolically ordered social unit is one in which the structures of the unit are ordered by symbolic words, actions,
and material artifacts. In a symbolically ordered community relationships among humans and between humans
and the world are what they are in virtue of the symbols
they use and that give them meaning. An example of part
of the premodern symbolic order is the feast calendar of
the medieval Christian church, which governed much of
the life of the community: 11 November, St. Martin’s day,
was set aside for butchering meat animals. Plough Monday, the day when the activities of the agricultural year
began with the first plowing, was designated as the first
Monday after the Feast of Epiphany (6 January). Epiphany is a celebration of the incarnation of God the Son in
the West. In the East it is a celebration of Jesus’s baptism.
Whichever way one understands the holiday of Epiphany, it is surely no coincidence that medieval Christians
lived lives in which the appearance of God as a human
being and the first day of ploughing were intimately connected. For a medieval Christian, the end of the winter

W

e talk a great deal about diversity today. We live
in a society that cannot ignore the diverse ways
of living that are found within it. We have a variety of
national origins. We are of many races. We are adherents
to many religions. Our unity as a country and as a church
requires that we reflect on that diversity and its implications. It has often been noted that each of those differences between us presents both a possibility for prejudice and misunderstanding as well as an opportunity for
learning and understanding. With that well-worn truism
in mind, I wish to look at one slice of our diversity, religion. And I will slice diversity even thinner by looking
only at four religions, Judaism, Islam, traditional Christianity, and Mormonism. I am interested in thinking about
how we think about religion when we think about diversity and in using overviews of those four religions to do
so.

Religion as Symbolic Ordering

From the historical and anthropological points of view
we think about religion strangely.
Historically our understanding is strange because prior
to about the fifteenth or sixteenth century, in Europe religion was understood very differently than it was after
that point. Prior to that time, religion was the ordering
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season and the end of the human winter that Christ
brought about were related typologically: the revelation
of God as a human or the revelation that a human is God
was the figure; the end of winter and the ability to produce food for oneself and one’s family was the resulting
type. Of course the calendar was not the only way that
religion ordered medieval lives. Children were brought
into the community through the sacrament of baptism,
families were created by the sacrament of marriage, and
death was recognized through the rites of burial. Religion
was “an apparatus established by God within human history to serve as the framework for his encounter with
humankind.”1
That understanding of the place of religion in our
lives did not change drastically until approximately the
sixteenth century. And by the seventeenth it is so much
no longer the dominant way of understanding the world
that someone like the philosopher René Descartes
(1596–1650) could say that religion deals only with morality.2 It is no longer the ordering force of the world as a
whole. From an historical point of view, our understanding of religion is recent and confined to European culture
and those cultures that have been influenced by it.
The contemporary understanding of religion is also
anthropologically strange. We often think of religion as a
set of beliefs that one holds. Thinking that way, we assume
that our religious beliefs—conceptual representations of
the ideal world—are what make it possible for us to act
in religious ways. In our eyes that assumed connection
between belief and action is what makes belief fundamental. But that is a mistake. Holding particular beliefs
is not what makes one a religious person. One’s beliefs
are important to religion, but they are not central to it.
Thinking that they are is like mistaking spots on one’s
body for the measles rather than understanding that
those spots are a symptom of the measles.3 Beliefs are, as
it were, a “symptom” of religion, something that one has if
one is religious, but they are not religion itself.
Perhaps no one has done more to show that being
religious is more than holding some set of particular beliefs than the historian of religion Mircea Eliade
(1907–1986).4 He argues that we cannot understand
religion except as a way of being in the world in which
the sacred gives meaning to our world. A religious person finds himself in a world revealed by a sacred order,
by the manifestation of something divine, whether that is

the Christian God, other gods, the ancestors, or sacred
plants or animals.
The sacred reveals itself in symbols. Eliade says “Every
religious act, by the simple fact that it is religious, is endowed with a meaning which, in the last instance, is ‘symbolic,’ since it [ultimately] refers to supernatural values
or beings.”5 Because it is symbolic, religion involves rites,
practices, social structures, and so on. It also involves beliefs. But those things are not the essence of religion, they
are its expression. The essence of religion is the recognition of the appearance of the sacred in the world—to
return to an earlier example, epiphany is the essence of
religion. Religious life is life for which the ordering revealed in that manifestation of the sacred gives form to
life in general. Ritual and the rest, including belief, are
expressions of a religious way of life, a way of life which
sees the world in terms of the sacred, in terms of something of a different order, a different reality, revealing itself in the world.6
Secularism is supposedly the dominant structure of
society today. Some have responded to the rise of secularism by abandoning religion altogether. Others have
responded by keeping some religious practices—getting
married in the church, for example—but unloosing those
practices from their moorings in religious understanding
and belief.7 It might seem, then, that secularism has won
the day and that religion has been reduced merely to belief, that we are headed toward a time when there will no
longer be people who live in a religious world. That is
certainly the claim one hears from the “new atheists” such
as Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens: religion
is not only outmoded, it is on its last legs, they tell us; the
sooner we are done with it, the better.
As you might guess, my claim is the contrary: living in
the world as a believer is different today than it was six
hundred years ago, but there are still people who live in a
world that is largely symbolically ordered. Religion is not
likely to go away. Any attempt to understand the cultures
of the world and the people in those cultures will be inadequate if it ignores religion. That is not as obviously
true of Western culture, but it is also true. But if religion
is as I’ve described it, then understanding the social and
psychical lives of religious people will require more than
understanding their beliefs. It will require understanding
their being-in-the-world.
As I said earlier, to think about religious diversity and
its implications, I will look at four different, though re2
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lated religions: Judaism, traditional Christianity, Islam,
and Mormon Christianity. Relying on the seminal work
of the contemporary philosopher Rémi Brague (1947– )8
I will outline the different though overlapping symbolic
orders of each of these religions by focusing on the ways
in which they understand law. (It is not irrelevant that
during the medieval period, the word “law” was used to
designate different religions: “the law of the Moors,” for
example.9 Law is a particularly good focus for understanding these religions.) Presumably thinking at least
sketchily about the four different ways of understanding
law will give us a glimpse into the differences in the ways
their adherents are in the world.
Of course, I cannot discuss even one of these four religions in depth in a paper, perhaps not even in a book.
That means that to talk about four of them, I will have
to resort to the broad strokes of caricature. But in the
same way that the caricatures of a political cartoonist
can reveal what a detailed description might hide, I hope
that my caricatures will help us catch a glimpse of the
main lineaments of each of these four religions. So, the
first stroke of my caricature: I take the Jewish and Islamic
traditions to understand the law in terms of submission,
the traditional Christian to understand it in terms of
its absence, and the Mormons to understand it in terms
of organization and family. That is not to say that there
are no elements of submission in Mormonism and traditional Christianity, nor that there are no elements of
organization in the Judaic take on law. It is to say that
submission, absence, and organization / family provide
a handy way of describing what I take to be the most
important lines in my sketches.

2. He must not be a foreigner.
3. He must not make himself rich.
4. He must make a copy of the divinely given Mosaic
Law, keep it by him, and study it.

The first and the last of these are particularly interesting, and the last, the insistence on written law, is unique
to Judaism among the other early religions of the Near
East. That insistence takes law to be something objective rather than the personal whim of the ruler. The law
is something interpreted by the priests and learned by
the king, but it is given by God. The king rules, but he
does not legislate—only God can do that—and there are
restrictions on his rule. We see here two ideas that were
new to the world: the law is written and it has a divine
origin. In these we see the one of the earliest ideas that
there are limitations on the power of the ruler, divine
limitations.
But the law in early Judaism differs from the law of
other nations in additional ways, for the Mosaic Law
(Torah) is first of all wisdom rather than law as we understand it. Indeed, the word “Torah” literally means
something more like “teaching” rather than “law.”10 It is
a teaching rather than a set of rules, though it contains
both prescriptions and proscriptions. In other religions
of the region, the rules of cultic practice were either rules
to be observed within a particular space, especially the
space of the temple, or they were rules observed by priests
in order to set themselves off as priests. In Exodus 19:6
the Lord says to Moses: “And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation. These are the words
which thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel” (italics added). Though the Levites are set apart as priests,
they are distributed throughout Israel, and in principle
every male is a priesthood holder. The temple offering at
the birth of a son is a recognition of that principle, for it
was an offering to redeem the son from priesthood service.
God tells Moses that Israel is to be a nation of priests. As
a result, as Brague says, “Israel is obliged to observe, at
all times, the code of conduct that pertains to pertains
to priests and to behave as if within the sanctuary.”11 For
an Israelite, the laws are the wisdom needed for one who
would live in the house of God. They teach one how to
be one of the people of God.
As the medieval Jewish thinker, Moses Maimonides
(1135–1204), explains,12 human laws only regulate the
actions of the body, but the Torah encourages human
beings to strive for both bodily and spiritual perfection.

Judaism

Begin with Judaism, the oldest of these Abrahamic religions. Israel as a whole had only a short time, about one
hundred years, as a nation under a king, and a slightly
longer history as two states. In spite of their only brief
experience as an independent state, during that time they
developed a unique kind of nation, and those unique
developments have been important to later philosophers
of politics and law, such as John Locke, as well as to later
founders of nations and states, such as Thomas Jefferson.
To a large extent, what made the Israelite nation
unique was that it had written rules for how to select a
king. Deuteronomy 17:14–20 tells us:
1. The king must be chosen by God.
3
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The law and God can be separated conceptually. God is
not his teaching. But in the law he has revealed himself
by teaching us what we are to do, so his law takes precedence. We submit to the law of God rather than to God
himself.
Though this strikes Christians as strange, perhaps
even blasphemous, it is an attitude that follows from the
Jewish understanding of law. For a Jew, it is not enough
to believe in God. Nor is it enough to have had an experience of God. One could have those beliefs or those
experiences and yet not really have known God. Indeed,
it is not difficult to think of those who seem to have had
exactly such experiences: they profess belief in God,
but clearly do not know him. The Bible describes such
people and Mormon scripture repeats the description:
“This people draw near me with their mouth, and with
their lips do honour me, but have removed their heart
far from me.”16 Others claim to have had experiences of
God, being overcome by the Spirit whether mystically
or otherwise, but there is little evidence in their lives afterward that they know him. Israel counters such possibilities with the Law: To know God, to love him, to
be in his covenant, part of his kingdom, is to live the life
he teaches. Obedience to the law is, thus, not the mere
submission of a slave to his or her master. Submission is
the way one worships, it is the way one knows God and
joins in community with others and with him. To love
the Torah more than “God” is to genuinely love the only
true God.

Indeed, the kabbalists ( Jewish mystics) believed that the
Torah corresponds “to the very structure and dimensions
of the divine; it constitutes its name (or names).”13 Israel
understands itself as elect because it has been given Torah, the teaching for divine life. And this connection of
ethical / moral values and life with religious practices,
the refusal to separate the two, is also novel. Other Near
Eastern groups keep them separate, with the latter, religion, being a matter only of cultic practice.14 This failure
to separate religion from ethical life made it nearly impossible for Roman conquerors to understand the Jewish,
and later the Christian, refusal to offer sacrifices to the
Roman emperor. Why, they wanted to know, wouldn’t
the Jews and then the Christians, just perform the cultic sacrifices since those have nothing to do with one’s
morality? Jewish and Christian insistence on the connection of religion and ethics was novel—and it made life
for them much different, and often much more difficult
because it separated them from the political state.
The separation of religion from the state which resulted from the refusal to separate religion and ethics had a
great deal to do with why the Jews were able to survive
after the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 AD. For nonIsraelites the cultic practices of religion were matters of
state. The destruction of one was the destruction of the
other. For the Jews, however, they were matters of ethics, how to live life in a divine way. So, after the destruction, the religion of Judaism was able to continue without
being part of any state. Political authority was that held
by whatever state the Jews lived in. It had nothing to do
with their religion. Unlike other nations, Israel had never
been defined by a territory (in spite of God’s gift of the
land). Instead, they were defined by their temple, temple
worship, and by the Mosaic Law—and by the first century AD, for a variety of reasons, the temple was less and
less important and the Mosaic Law was more and more
important. So, when the destruction happened, the fact
that Israel was defined by its religion, a religion that put
ethics and worship together and separated religion from
the state, made the survival of Judaism possible.
For Israel, the experience of the law was the experience
of a gift, the gift of the wisdom for living life in the family of God. That wisdom requires that one submit to its
teachings, but because that teaching is the only way in
which we can truly know God, we have the surprising
result that one contemporary, orthodox Jewish thinker
can title an essay “Loving the Torah more than God.”15

Islam

We begin to understand Islam when we understand
that the word “Islam” means “submission” and “Muslim”
means “one who submits.” The world of the Muslim is
a world organized and made meaningful by submission
to God. The basic religious attitude of Islam is, as the
name suggests, submission, obedience to the law. But, in
contrast to Judaism, the law is not the practices of the
priest taken up by the nation as a whole, and in Islam
when one obeys one obeys God rather than the law. Islam is an objective morality, and its goal is to produce a
political / social community of those who submit to the
revealed law.
Islam as we know it comes into being with the reception of the Qur’an by the Prophet Muhammad, who was
born on the Arab peninsula in 570 AD (died 632 AD).
But according to Islamic belief, Islam was revealed from
4
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the beginning. Just as Mormons believe that Adam had
the fulness of the gospel, Muslims believe that he received
the law taught by the Qur’an. Indeed, not only were the
words of the Qur’an revealed from the beginning of the
world, their content is also revealed from our beginnings
as individuals. According to Islam, every person is born
a Muslim. God created us Muslims. That is our natural state. But the traditions of our fathers have made us
led us away from our original state. Conversion means
returning to that state, our condition at birth, having
pledged fidelity to God and his law in the preexistence.17
Thus the foundation of Islam through the revelation
of the Qur’an to Muhammad was a restoration of what
had been given to Adam first and then also to each of
the prophets. Islam understands itself as a restoration
of what had been lost, and first and foremost, what had
been lost was the law. Muhammad was born into a tribal
society where law was a matter of blood line and worship
was a matter of idolatry. The tradition says that at the
age of forty (610) he received a visitation from the angel
Gabriel, the first of many revelations. These revelations
were memorized and later written down to form the
Qur’an, which means “the recitation.” (Muhammad himself was illiterate.) After receiving his first revelation Muhammad began to preach Islam to those around him, and
over time he made many converts, replacing idolatry with
the monotheistic worship of Allah (the Arabic word for
“God”) and creating a society based on law rather than
blood line. The Qur’an brought civilization to the Arab
peninsula by giving it law.
The law of the Qur’an, however, differs from that of the
Torah. For Islam the law is the objective manifestation
of God himself. The words are literally his words, not in
any sense the prophet’s understanding or interpretation
or restatement of what God said. The Qur’an cannot be
edited, translated, or interpreted because it is the direct
language of God. What the law commands in the Qur’an
(or the Hadith, sayings of the Prophet)—in other words,
what God himself commands—is good and what it prohibits is bad: God’s command defines good and evil. Personal judgment is in principle unneeded and irrelevant.
He created the world so that those created might submit
to him, not so that they could be taught to live the divine
life (as in Judaism) or adopted into the divine family (as
in Christianity).18 God’s law is the means for bringing
about that submission.

As in Judaism, over time the laws multiplied, governing
what seem to outsiders like rules concerning trivial acts,
such as whether one can twiddle one’s thumbs, which
children’s games are permissible, and which hand to use
in the toilet. But whatever the criticisms one can make of
this multiplication and this concern for what seems trivial, it reflects “a noble idea that everything is holy: since
God is present everywhere, he must be worshiped in all
things.”19 For the Muslim there is no sphere of life into
which God does not enter through his law.
God’s presence in all aspects of life and the divine character of law explain what is, for most of those outside
Islam, at least puzzling and at most grounds for believing that it will be impossible ever for Islam to co-exist
with what we call “the West” (though it is important to
remember that most Muslims live outside of the areas we
usually associate with that extreme difficulty and most
have no difficulty co-existing with non-Muslims—and
most Muslims already co-exist with the West). Recall
that Islam begins, not just as a religion, but also as a state,
with the destruction of relationships based on blood
ties and the creation of a politico-religious community.
From the beginning Islam has been part of the political
domain. Whereas we saw Israel distinguishing between
religion and the state, but not distinguishing between religion and ethics, Islam doesn’t distinguish between any
of the three: the political is the ethical, and both are
encompassed in the religious. This means that the power
of Allah himself is political.20
In the United States religion has most often supported
the separation of church and state, and it has often encouraged that separation. But “for Islam, [in principle]
the separation of the political and the religious has no
right to exist. It is even shocking, for it seems like an
abandonment of human affairs to the power of evil or a
relegation of God to a place outside his proper sphere.”21
If we say that God reveals himself only in his law, a law
that cannot be differentiated from either politics or ethics, then to say that religion should remove itself from
the state is tantamount to saying that law is irrelevant
to the state. If God is present everywhere and must be
worshiped in everything, then the state can be no exception. States which deny this are not just mistaken, they
blaspheme.
This connection between the political and the religious
explains the origin of radical Islam. Of course there are
many more in Islam who are not radical than who are,22 but
5
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radical Islam is an extremist interpretation of something
real within Islam: Unlike Christ who died on a cross, executed by the political and religious authorities, Muhammad died in his bed, and Muhammad was aware of that
difference. As a result, “Islam understands the martyr as
a combatant who falls while killing, not as a victim who
accepts being put to death. Defeat is not conceived as
concealing a deeper victory, reserved for resurrection”23
There is no concept of quietly accepting one’s fate and
having everything made right in the next world. It does
not follow that one must be a martyr for Islam, but it
does follow that political quietism is not the way of Islam.
The faithful Muslim submits to the will of God and in
doing so is building a community of others who have also
submitted. The ultimate goal is to bring all back to the
submission to which they originally swore.24

it did for either Jews or Muslims, for Christianity insists
that the observance of the law must make complete the
inner attitudes from which those laws ultimately spring.26
Contrary to the interpretation that many Christians
were later to give this insistence, and the way some continue to understand the relationship between Christianity and Judaism, the insistence on inner attitude was
not a development against the Judaic understanding, but
of it. In Judaism living the law means learning to do
what God does; in Christianity it means learning to
do what God does and with the correct attitude. Indeed,
for a Christian, having the correct attitude, having faith,
is what makes genuinely living the law possible.
But Christians not only expanded what it meant to
keep the law, they also introduced a new element, conscience. In Romans 4:15 Paul argues that there can be
no crime without a law,27 which means that the law
describes the limits of good and evil: we know evil only
because we have learned a law. But even those who have
not been taught the law know something of what is right
and wrong.28 They have conscience. But if we can know
the law through conscience, then though God is the origin of the law, he is not—at least not directly—the law
giver. Conscience is the proximate law giver, and God is
the origin of conscience.
Paul also suggests an understanding of the purpose
of the law that is radically different from the way Islam
would later understand law and perhaps different than
the way previously Israel did. In 1 Corinthians 10:23 Paul
says “There is a saying, ‘Everything is permissible’—but
not everything is profitable. ‘Everything is permissible’—
but not everything is upbuilding” (my translation). The
law is not defined by the will of God, but by what it will
do to make us better. Thus, we do not obey the law to
please God, though he is pleased when we do. We obey
because the commandment he has given us will make us
better people, more like him.
Thus, the ultimate goal of any commandment is freedom, freedom from sin, liberation from a state in which
we are not living the lives we want to live even when we
do what we think we want to do. And the goal of the law is
not just to get us to cease to act in sinful ways, but to overcome our desire to sin. As the last half of Romans 7 shows
us, Paul is well aware of the difficulty that overcoming sin
poses. But what he has in mind when he thinks about law
“is less a collection of commandments and prohibitions
[that tell us how to behave] than a [completely] different

Traditional Christianity

Judaism was unique among its ancient sister religions
for taking the law to be divine and for insisting that it
can and ought to be put into writing. It was also unique
for first bringing together the ethical and the political.
Christianity is a revolution, a turning, within that unique
movement.
As members of the kingdom of God, Christians are
foreigners in the states within which they live. As a sect
of Jews, initially Christianity takes the separation of religion from the state that had its genesis in Israel further
even than Judaism had. Judaism had founded the unity of
the community on respect for shared law, and it had created a divine community on that law. But for Christians,
the kingdom of God is not of this world.25 Christianity
dispenses with shared law as the basis for community—
though it does not dispense with law—and founds the
community, instead, on respect for shared faith. Even
when Christianity later obtained political power, it always recognized the difference between the power of the
rulers and the power of the state. The result was that for
centuries Christian countries had two sets of laws, religious law and civil law.
Contrary to what Christians sometimes say about the
early Church, it did not reject the Law of Moses. In Acts
the question is never whether converts from Judaism
should stop practicing the commandments, but whether
converts from outside of Israel must obey it. For Christians, however,“law” means something very different than
6
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regime of salvation.”29 The ultimate goal of law is to discipline our souls to love the good so that we can follow the
admonition of Augustine, “Love and do what you want,”
but no set of laws can give us that discipline by itself.
In the end, then, there is no law for the Christian, at
least not in a sense recognizable within either Judaism or
Islam. The law is at best, as Paul says, a schoolmaster, a
teacher, but even as a teacher it is temporary. If we have
faith, in other words if we have trust in God—if we live
by his Spirit and the instruction of that Spirit—we have
no need for the law.30 We can become what the law intends for us to become but cannot finally fully teach us.

ing about them38) everyone goes to some heaven, to some
kingdom of glory ruled by a member of the Godhead,
each with its own law.39 Mormonism preaches a modified
form of universal salvation. The question is, therefore,
not “Will I be saved in the kingdom of glory?” but “What
level in the kingdoms of glory will I reach?” with the highest level being a couple married by the priesthood and
capable of being like God. The answer to the question
about one’s level of glory is determined by obedience, but
that is not primarily obedience to the ethical laws, but
more importantly participation in the prescribed ordinances and faithfulness to the covenants of those ordinances.40 Law does not save a person. Christ does that.
But the degree of obedience to law, particularly in the
form of ordinance, places that person at a particular level
in the hierarchy of the afterworld.41 As mentioned earlier, howver, this view is complicated considerably by the
idea that if one lives by the Spirit neither prescription
nor proscription is needed, though organizing principles
as well as ordinances and covenants are.
The highest degree of heavenly reward, the highest degree of postmortal existence, called “exaltation,” requires
law in the form of ordinance and covenant, for those who
reach that level of reward are men and women who have
been sealed to each other for time and eternity as conjugal couples. Their promise is “a fulness and a continuation of the seeds forever and ever.”42
Law, then, has two primary functions in Latter-day
Saint thinking: it organizes us, ultimately organizing us
according to our desires and acts, placing us in the glory most appropriate to us; and it brings us together in
eternal family units. It teaches us, as the Law of Moses
teaches Israel, but it does not demand our submission
in the way that Islamic law demands the submission of
Muslims. It recognizes the insight of traditional Christianity that we must be beyond the law if we are to serve
God faithfully, yet it nevertheless maintains a notion of
law. For traditional Christianity the believer may begin
in something like Islamic submission,43 but the objective
of Christian faith is to overcome the law, to live “by
the Spirit” instead. By reinserting the notion of life by the
Spirit back into the Israelite notion of covenant law, the
Mormon position could be understood as either a synthesis of the other two or a continuing development of
the them.

Mormonism

A person reading only the Book of Mormon would not
see anything about law that is very different from traditional Christianity: the Mosaic Law was a schoolmaster
and Christ’s atoning sacrifice introduced a new regime of
salvation. Jesus, a person, is the law31; there is no longer
a code of law except as a temporary expedient. But the
Doctrine and Covenants adds something new. The New
Testament seldom mentions law, except when referring
to the Law of Moses. Likewise the Book of Mormon. But
the Doctrine and Covenants speaks of law more than a
hundred times, and rarely uses the term to refer to the
Law of Moses. Mormonism is awash in law.
For example, the Doctrine and Covenants tells us that
the transgression of law has made us “sensual and devilish,”32 that there are no merely temporal laws,33 and that
just as Christ gives laws by which we are to organize
ourselves and live now,34 he will give us a law by which
to live when he comes.35 Law is central to the Mormon
understanding of religion, but it is not a law to which one
merely submits. And though it is true that the law of the
Spirit is a necessary adjunct to any laws we have—we
cannot live justly, righteously, if we do not live the law
by the Spirit rather than by the letter—nevertheless, we
never find ourselves, whether premortally, mortally, or
postmortally, outside the realm of law.
According to Mormonism, law is that which organizes
our relationships amongst ourselves as the relationships
among God’s children ought to be organized.36 It is his
word: his decree and his promise.37 But there are alternative laws, several of them.
For Mormons the question of salvation is not really
whether one will go to heaven or hell. With a few exceptions (whom I will ignore because we know almost noth7

volume 33

issues in religion and psychotherapy 2009

CONCLUSION

With voluntarism, his will takes that position. On a voluntarist
view, religious beliefs are representations to ourselves of the religious aspect of the ideal world. As such, they make it possible for
us to act in religious ways. Therefore, beliefs are fundamental to
religion. To take religion to be a matter of symbolic ordering is
to reject this understanding of the connection between religion
and belief.

Each of these ways of understanding the relationship
to the law results in different ways of understanding one’s
place in and relationship to the world. It isn’t just that
each of the believers in these religious traditions believes
in different propositions. Rather, each lives in the world
differently. One result of that difference is misunderstanding—again, not misunderstanding of the propositions to which each assents. It is perfectly possible that
a Mormon could understand the beliefs of a traditional
Christian or an observant Jew or a devout Muslim. But
the Mormon would have difficulty understanding the
possibility of believing those things. He or she could repeat
the beliefs and perhaps even explain them, but feeling
like they make sense would be more difficult. The world
of possible things, ideas, and relationships is different for
each of these traditions, though they often overlap. But
if we relegate our attempts to understand one another to
the beliefs we hold, we will not understand one another.
Understanding requires what hermeneutic philosophers call a “fusion of horizons.” At least temporarily I
must try to understand the other person’s position as if it
makes sense. Seeing things from another person’s point
of view means understanding such things as the law in
the way that the person understands them. Allowing
the law and everything else in question to have the same
place in the world, psychically and existentially as well as
conceptually, that it has for the adherent. I don’t have to
believe that the other person may be right. I need only
see that the view of the other person makes sense even if
I believe it is wrong.
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5. Mircea Eliade, “Methodological Remarks on the Study of Religious Symbolism,” in The history of religions: Essays on methodology,
edited by Joseph Kitagawa and Mircea Eliade (Chicago: U of
Chicago, 1959) 95.
6. It is not directly relevant to this essay, but it is important to recognize that Eliade’s understanding of religion is insufficient when it
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